Hi all, this is an essay for history I had to do that was due yesterday. The prompt concerned diplomacy and debate demonstrated in history, so I figured I would go with one of the most hated countries ever: Israel, but, my teacher told me that was too broad, and she was right considering if I went with that, I would have to write an entire five-hundred-page book, heck, double that if I wanted to fit everything. So I went with the Camp David Accords of 1978. Enjoy.
“‘Better to die honorably than to live in humiliation” (Biographies 246): these were the words of former Egyptian President Anwar Sadat, and if any one reason could be singled out as the driving force behind the numerous and ongoing Israeli-Arab conflicts, it would be honor. The Holy Land and its locales hold great significance to those who practice the Abrahamic religions, especially those who founded the country of Israel, the Jewish people. Since its inception on May 14, 1948 (Schroeter 7), Israel has faced many challenges concerning diplomacy with its often hostile neighbors, having to justify its own existence. But, after much war, one stepping stone for peace was reached by Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin and the aforementioned Sadat, alongside mediator United States President Jimmy Carter: the peace talks that lasted for a grand total of thirteen days at the presidential resort Camp David in Maryland that led to the Camp David Accords of 1978, which in turn, set the stage for a treaty between the two countries the next year on March 26, 1979 (Goldschmidt 206; Worth 76). Despite Sadat’s assassination, the reason for which was his signing of the Camp David Accords, the pact kept by both parties has proven to be successful because of the positive and reluctant acceptance by the world and the long-standing peace with Egypt.
The Camp David Accords were largely validated by globe, although that did take quite some time. First, to understand why some countries would oppose the Accords, it is necessary to define what the Accords’ prescriptions are. The agreement, finalized on September 17, 1978, laid out that Israel would eventually vacate the much contested Sinai Peninsula, Egypt would produce structured diplomacy with Israel, the United States would give billions of dollars in funding for both countries, and concerning Palestinians, negotiations surrounding their autonomy were promised in the future, the Accords noting that the negotiations “‘must also recgnize the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people and their just requirements’” (Goldschmit 204-206; Schroeter 125; Worth 76). These guidelines were adhered to by all three countries: Israel ceded the Sinai a tad more than three years after the treaty was signed, Egypt has not had another war with Israel since, and the United States followed through with its payments. The next year, Sadat and Begin met on the White House lawn, b shook hands, and signed the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty, which was necessary as they were both still technically at war with each other (Goldschmit 206, 214). Once the Accords were made official, appreciation from countries around the world of willingness of Begin, Sadat, and the countries they were representing lifted them up to the status of peacemaker, for the most part. Besides the most powerful country in the world showing its support, the United States of America, Sadat and Begin received the Nobel Peace Prize, an obviously prestigious award that elevates those who are notable enough to receive it onto the world stage, furthering the spread of their cause, which in of itself is a victory for diplomacy and often a sign of the changing tides of an international debate (Schroeter 125). But, as could be expected, if a country is not going to acknowledge another country, then it is not going to acknowledge the treaties it will make; the events that led to Camp David first began with Anwar Sadat’s announcement that he intended to seek peace with Israel, culminating in his address to the Knesset, the Israeli legislature, saying that he opted to “‘set aside all precedents and traditions known by warring countries’”, despite his acknowledge that this would be “‘considered by many to be the most difficult road’”, but other Arab countries did the exact opposite (Biographies 255; Schroeter 124). Sadat refused from these nations five million dollars for his person, two billion dollars in aid, and Egypt soon after experienced severe consequences from its former allies: Egypt faced total economic sanctions from seventeen countries and the Arab League headquarters relocated from Cario to Tunis, in a move originally organized by the president of Iraq, Saadam Hussien, presenting clear signs of heightened tensions. (Biographies 257-259; Goldschmidt 206). Eventually though, the message of diplomacy- and the ability to have a debate at all- was accepted by Arabs states, in that they interacted with Egypt and even had the Arab League headquarters return to Cairo in 1990, a bit more than a decade after it have previously left the Egyptian capital (Goldschmidt 214) If this whole series of happenings is to mean anything, it signifies, and of course not universally, that countries which stand firm in their beliefs and do not budge a muscle, especially if they have more power whether within themselves or allies, as a result, will soon have other countries accept them, whether out of a need to appease, receive mercy, or just plainly stay on their good side. This is the entire point of diplomacy: mutual agreements that must be accepted to be validated. Most of the time in diplomacy, it seems that actions speak louder than words, and if so, the Camp David Accords were as loud as a bullet being fired right next to the listener’s ear. The reason that the legacy of the Accords have lived on, even after Sadat’s assasination in 1981, was because it was a statement that proved that some level of peace could be obtained (Biographies 259). The Camp David Accords have proven to be successful because of its convictions and results being recognized by the world.
In addition, the Camp David Accords brought peace between these three nations, which furthermore solidifies it as a victory. The history of wars between Egypt and Israel is a dense, extensive history. One of the most notable was the Six Day War. The Soviet-backed president of Egypt, Col. Gamal Abdel Nasser, when he asked the United Nations to reduce the U.N. Emergency Force from the Sinai Peninsula, they surprisingly withdrew all of the deployed men and Nasser, in a repeat move made ten years before, blockaded the Straits of Tiran, where the Red Sea connects to the Indian Ocean, thus preventing Israeli trade. Nasser closed in on Israel and conquered the Sinai Peninsula (Biographies 252; Schroeter 109, 113). Israel did not cower. On June 5, 1967, Israeli planes took off early in the morning and bombed Egyptian airfields, completely decimating their air force, that also happened to be readied by Anwar Sadat. Israel then proceeded to claim Gaza, the West Bank from Jordan, the Golan Heights from Syria, the Sinai Peninsula, and the most crucial landmark in the history of West, Jerusalem (Worth 51) : the Israeli Defense Forces, often shortened to I.D.F., won East Jerusalem in extremely brutal fighting. One Israeli soldier shared his combat experiences in Jerusalam, saying:
We got to St. Stephen’s Gate and we could see the Western Wall, through an archway. We saw it before, but this time it was right in front of us. It was like new life, as though we had just woken up. We dashed down the steps; we were among the first to get there, but a few had already got there and I could see them, men that were too tired to stand up any more, sitting by the Wall, clutching it, kissing the stones, and crying. We all of us cried. That was what we had been fighting for. It goes so deep, this emotion we felt when we reached the wall. (Schroeter 114).
This war might have been the greatest military victory for Israel ever, as there were around eight-hundred casualties on the Israeli side. On the other hand, the estimated death toll of the Arab nations was a combined thirty-thousand (Schroeter 114). Then, two years later, Nasser fought a “War of Attrition” with Israel. Dr. Arthur Goldschmit Jr. in his book A Brief History of Egypt wrote that his “strategy was to make the cost of the occupation to Israel in human lives and manpower losses unbearably high, or perhaps to convince Washington that it must force Israel to withdraw from Sinai” and that these tactics “proved costly to Egypt” (Goldschmidt 183). Israel retaliated by launching a “war of nerves.” They fought in mostly isolated bursts of skirmishes that lasted from 1969 to 1970 (Goldschmit 183; Schroeter 119). The most recent and the final Egypt-Israel war was the Yom Kippur War. It began on October 6, 1973, on the feast of Yom Kippur, one of the holiest days on the Jewish calendar, when Syria, which at the time was supported by the U.S.S.R, and Egypt joined forces and retook the Sinai Peninsula and the Golan Heights, which Israel later retook as well (Schroeter 121). Clearly, there is a vast record of passionate hatred expressed in warfare between these two countries. So then, the question to ask is why have there been no recent wars? Well, the Camp David Accords are to thank for that. Diplomacy between America and Egypt and America and Israel is still active to this day and several events in history have proven that both Middle Eastern countries respect America. Money did play a part in ensuring the United States’ future in these nations; in accordance with the deal, the United States gave three billion dollars to Israel for the purpose of paying for the cost of the process of leaving the Sinai and two billion dollars to Egypt in artillery and aircraft, and they got even more out of the deal (Goldschmidt 206). In fact, to this day, Israel and Egypt continue to receive billions annually (Benson et al) and whether it was the money or the respect they earned that encouraged them, both have been United States allies for decades. Anwar Sadat might very well have paid for his life by making peace with Israel, as he was killed by a radical Egyptian Muslim terrorist group two years after the final peace treaty (Biographies 256), and in spite of that, after that misfortune, Egypt still allied with America: America enjoined Egypt to assist in defeating the Iraqi President Sadaam Hussein after Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, beginning the Gulf War of 1991. Egyptian forces participated in Operation Desert Storm in the tens-of-thousands. Proceeding the war, Western nations absolved Egyptian debts by fourteen billion dollars (Goldschmidt 215). Israel also paparticipated the broad War on Terror sparked by the events of September 11, 2001 by fighting back against jihadist Palestinian Islamist terroristsn through multiple military operations, Islamist being the name for an individual bearing Osama Bin Laden’s ideology, Islamism (Primary Soucres 160; Worth 101). The fact alone that violence between these two nations has not yet broken out is shocking, considering the rather troubled history in that region of the world that has a pattern of wars among neighboring states, especially against Israel. There has been a total lack of war between Israel and Egypt since Camp David, and not just that, but support in war from Egypt and Israel to the United States. The Camp David Accords laid out a future of peace and potential prosperity between America, Egypt, and Israel that has, indeed, been realized.
The diplomacy that produced the Camp David Accords, as well as the Accords themselves, was successful in that they were validated by the world and generated a period of long-lasting peace. Taking into account the length of the conflict between Arab countries- not just Egypt- these Accords truly were historic because they produced a previously unheard of peace and proved to nations around the globe that positive decisions that could alter the world order could be made in thirteen days, as long as debate and diplomacy are allowed to take place. The peacemaking, deal-breaking mindset held by two or more parties is a help, nay, a necessity for diplomatic action to reach any serious objective. True diplomacy and political debate, whether international or domestic, always follows certain staples: the rigidity of core values, the flexibility of compromise, and the attempt to implement beneficial, mutual change. Israel and Egypt held these principles and thus were able to find some breathing room that was crucial in creating a breakthrough deal. If one views the world today in its whole, what they will see is massive discord and commonality of war. Diplomacy and debates are the ideals of the free world and ideals are rarely actualized. The Camp David Accords taught the world that although it may take decades for the conventions of aggression to be broken, the ideal is possible, which while being a very optimistic and occasionally impossible solution being that this is a fallen world, is still worth grasping.
Works Cited
Benson et al. "Camp David Accords." UXL Encyclopedia of U.S. History, vol. 2, UXL, 2009, pp. 234-235. Gale In Context: High School,
link.gale.com/apps/doc/CX3048900099/SUIC?u=atholtonhsmc&sid=bookmark-SUIC&xid=2a 5d575. Accessed 20 Apr. 2022.
Goldschmidt, Arthur, Jr. A Brief History of Egypt. Facts on File, 2008.
Pendergast, Tom and Sara Pendergast. Middle East Conflict: Biographies. Thomson Gale, 2006.
---. Middle East Conflict: Primary Sources. Thomson Gale, 2006.
Schroeter, Daniel J. Israel: An Illustrated History. Oxford University Press, 1998.
Worth, Richard. Open for Debate:The Arab-Israeli Conflict. Marshall Cavendish Corporation, 2007.
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